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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
New York has recognized that education in predominantly Negro
schools tends to be inferior.28 The equal protection clause does
not sentence the state to feigned indifference of such inadequacy; it
does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to
be treated as though they were the same.2' It seeks only invidious
discrimination."
Since the state has a natural interest in the well-being of its
populace, it seems entirely reasonable for it to take voluntary af-
firmative action to correct deficiencies accruing to one dass alone.
The mere fact that a scheme to accomplish such a purpose might
cause discontent among classes hitherto favorably situated, whose
future risk is only that of equal educational opportunity, should
present no bar to a plan which may some day benefit all.
W. W. WALKER, JR.
SCHOOLS - RULES AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING
MARRIED STUDENTS - REASONABLENESS AND
VALIDITY
State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 189 N.E.2d 181
(Ohio C.P. 1962).
The Ohio General Assembly has vested in the boards of educa-
tion the power to make rules and regulations for the government
of public school pupils.' This power confers upon the boards the
authority and responsibility for the proper conduct, control, regu-
lation, and supervision of its employees, pupils, and the entire school
system of the district.2
gation ordinance); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (racial classification for
seating in court); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(racial classifications and restaurants); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960)
(racial classifications and bus terminals); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (racial classification and public schools); Henderson v. United States, 339
U.S. 816 (1950) (racial classifications and railroad dining cars); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948) (racial convenants); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1946) (racial classifications and labor unions); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) (racial classifications and voting); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879) (racial classifications and juries).
28. See the material condensed in In the Matter of Skipwith, 14 Misc. 2d 325, 180
N.Y.S.2d 852 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1958). A similar conclusion has been reached in a study
conducted in Cleveland, Ohio. Research Dept. of the Cleveland Urban League, The
Negro in Cleveland, 1950-1963, June, 1964.
29. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. William-
son, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
30. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
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In State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, Michael Baker, a seventeen
year old high school senior, claimed that the school board abused
its statutory power by adopting a rule which prohibited all married
students from participation in extracurricular activities.' Baker was
married in February 1962 at the age of sixteen,' and in the fall of
1962 he attempted to compete for a position on the basketball team.
The high school administration invoked the new school board rule
and precluded his participation in this extracurricular activity. Baker
sought a writ of mandamus6 to restrain enforcement of the rule
on the grounds that it was arbitrary, unreasonable, and discrimina-
tory against married students. The court ruled that the school
board's rule was not so unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory
to married students as to violate the public policy favoring marriage;
and that since the legislature had defined the minimum age of mar-
riage as twenty-one, without parental consent, or eighteen for males
and sixteen for females, with parental consent,' marriage under
these ages was contrary to public policy.' The court of common
pleas also found that it was not an abuse of discretion to bar a mar-
ried student from extracurricular activities in light of the fact that
high school marriages cause many to quit school and that married
students set a pattern for their fellow students to imitate, especially
if they excel in an extracurricular activity.'
The problems between the schools and its pupils have tradi-
tionally been many and diverse.1" But the problems between
schools and married students have become particularly acute in
1. OHIO REv. CODE § 3313.20.
2. See 48 OHIo JuF. 2d Schools § 81 (1961).
3. 189 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
4. Extracurricular activities included but were not limited to the following: Leader-
ship in school organizations, athletic activities, scholarship activities, member of band
and glee club, social events, dramatic events and musical activities, cheerleader, and
school sponsored trips. Id. at 183.
5. Baker was married under the provisions of OHIO REV. CODE § 3101.04, which
provides inter alia: "when the condition of a minor female is such as imperatively to
impel the marriage estate by reason of approaching maternity, or when an illegitimate
child has been born, the matter shall be inquired into by the juvenile court... The
probate court may thereupon issue a license, notwithstanding either or both the con-
tracting parties for the marital relation are under the minimum age prescribed in section
3101.01 of the Revised Code ......
6. See 48 OuIO JUL. 2d Schools § 82 (1961).
7. OHIo REv. CODE § 3101.01.
8. State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 189 N.E.2d 181, 187 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
9. Id. at 185.
10. See generally 47 AM. JuR. Schools § 167 (1943); 79 CJ.S. Schools and School
Districts § 495 (1952).
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recent years, due mainly to the trend toward a lower age of first
marriage." The limited number of cases dealing with the validity
of school board rules and regulations relative to this problem may
be broadly classified into three groups. The board's ruling either:
(1) totally excluded the married student from school; (2) at-
tempted to force married students to attend school through com-
pulsory attendance laws; or (3) partially excluded the married
pupil by either (a) total exclusion for a limited time, or (b)
permanent exclusion from part of the school's activities. The earli-
est cases in this area dealt with the first issue, i.e., whether a school
board had the power to expel a married student. 2 The courts
uniformly held that barring a student entirely from school was arbi-
trary and unreasonable and therefore was void despite the board's
claims that married students had a detrimental effect on the school
and its pupils, lacked the necessary parental supervision, and held
views on life that should not be known to unmarried students.
Thus, the prevailing view at that time as expressed by an early
Mississippi decision was that "marriage is a domestic relation highly
favored by the law .... And ... it is commendable in married per-
sons of school age to desire to further pursue their education. . .. ""
The second group of cases arose when school boards attempted
to compel married students to attend school under compulsory
school attendance laws. 4 In a pair of Louisiana decisions,"5 it was
held that upon marriage the school child was emancipated and thus
was no longer subject to the compulsory attendance law. The ra-
tionale was that the requirement of school attendance might come in
conflict with the married student's right to live with her spouse, and
it was "not only her right but her duty to live with her husband
at the matrimonial domicile and to follow him wherever he chooses
to reside."'"
The third category of cases involved the question of whether a
11. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 34 (1959).
12. Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 Pac. 1065 (1929); McLeod v. State
ex rel. Colmer, 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737 (1929).
13. McLeod v. State ex rel. Colmer, 154 Miss. 468, 475, 122 So. 737, 738-39 (1929).
The Ohio Court of Appeals is in accord with these decisions. See reference to an un-
reported case in State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 175 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ohio C.P.
1961).
14. E.g., L.A. REV. STAT. § 17.221 (Rev'd ed. 1964); cf. OHIO REV. CODE § 3321.01.
15. In re State in Interest of Goodwin, 214 La. 1062, 39 So. 2d 731 (1949); State v.
Priest, 210 La. 389, 27 So. 2d 173 (1946).
16. In re State in Interest of Goodwin, 214 La. 1062, 1063, 39 So. 2d 731, 733
(1949).
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school board had the power to suspend a married student from
school for a limited time. In a recent Kentucky case,17 the court
struck down a school board's ruling which required a student to
withdraw for a period of one year following marriage. In deter-
mining that many married students would probably never return to
school after a year's absence, the court took judicial notice of the
increasing demand for education in today's society and observed that
"there is no reason to suppose that the marriage of a student will
diminish the need of that student for an education - indeed, just
the contrary would appear the case."'" A Tennessee court,'9 how-
ever, upheld a very similar regulation that suspended a pupil for the
remainder of the semester in which she married. The court's hold-
ing was based on expert testimony of a school administrator which
tended to show that married students were a particularly difficult
problem immediately after marriage, but "settled down" after the
"newness" wore off.
A variation of this same question is the validity of a school board
ruling that permits a married student to attend school, but perma-
nently prohibits such a student from participation in school activities.
In a case directly in point with the subject case, a Texas court refused
an injunction to arrest a rule that limited married students wholly to
classroom work."° The court held that the public policy in favor
of marriage was only for those above lawful age, and therefore the
board's rule was reasonable. A similar rule was upheld by a Utah
court, wherein a student claimed a constitutional right to participate
in all school activities 1 The court held he had a right to attend
school under the Utah Constitution, but extracurricular activities were
provided solely at the discretion of the local school boards. Since
these functions are discretionary, the local boards have the right to
select who will participate in such activities. But, in Cochrane v.
Mesick Consol. School Dist. Bd. of Educ.,22 a divided Michigan court
held to the contrary. There it was found that a rule which pro-
hibited married students from participating in extracurricular activi-
ties was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore void. The court
17. Board of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1964).
18. Id. at 680.
19. State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d
57 (1957).
20. Kissick v. Garland Independent School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959).
21. Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963).
22. 360 Mich. 390, 103 N.W.2d 569 (1960) (advisory opinion since relator's grad-
uation made the case moot).
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reasoned that "denying a married student the right to education,
whether a partial denial such as denying the right to participate in
extracurricular activities, or a complete denial such as expulsion or
suspension, was not a reasonable exercise of authority ... ."2
In order to inquire into the wisdom of the Baker holding, it. is
necessary to determine whether the school board's rule was unreason-
able or deprived the married student of his rights. 4 The stated pur-
pose of the rule was to discourage juvenile marriages which the
board assumed resulted in school drop-outs. While this is a logical
assumption, there is considerable evidence to the contrary. Sociolo-
gists and educators maintain that, generally, marriage does not cause
drop-out; rather, that both marriage and quitting school are a result
of the fact that a student has reached, or feels that he has reached,
the limit of his educational ability and intellectual maturity. 5 Thus,
both marriage and drop-out are the effect of a central cause; one is
not the cause and the other the effect.
In the Baker case, the court found that married students often set
a pattern of behavior that other students tend to imitate; that this is
especially true if a married student excels in school activities. This
influence, it was maintained by the board, has an undesirable effect
on the other members of the married student's class. But in McLeod
v. State ex rel. Colmer,26 a Mississippi court rebutted a similar argu-
ment with the following statement: "When the [marriage] relation
is entered into.., the effect on the husband and wife is refining and
elevating, rather than demoralizing. Pupils associating in school
with a child occupying such a relation, it seems, would be benefited
instead of harmed." 27 To determine which view is correct, the Baker
court suggests that expert testimony of school superintendents and
administrators should be considered. There is justification for this
position." Since the problem of student marriages is national as
well as local, it would be appropriate to determine how a majority of
school principals, administrators, and superintendents view this prob-
23. Id. at 401, 103 N.W.2d at 575.
24. Brown v. Board of Educ., 6 Ohio N.P. 411, 413 (C.P. 1899).
25. See generally Burchinal, School Policies and School Age Marriages, The Family
Life Coordinator, March 1960, p. 43; Havighurst, Early Marriage and the Schools, The
School Review, Spring 1961, p. 36.
26. 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737 (1929).
27. Id. at 475, 122 So. at 738.
28. State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 189 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Ohio C.P. 1962); accord,
State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 33, 302 S.W.2d
57, 59 (1957).
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lem. Some research has already been done in this area. A recent sur-
vey of over 16,000 school executives indicates that slightly over one-
third thought that married students should or could be excluded
from extracurricular activities, but the majority were either of a
contrary opinion, or reserved comment on the problem." Thus,
there is indeed some question as to whether any of the sanctions thus
far imposed by school boards have any effect in curbing teen-age
marriages.30
In dealing with a school board's power to discipline, the Iowa
Supreme Court has stated: "The State [by any government body]
does not deprive its citizens of... their liberty or of any rights,
except as a punishment for a crime."'" Has a student who has
married while still in high school committed any crime which would
justify a deprivation of the right to attend school and participate in
all activities included in the educational program? It would seem
not, unless, of course, youthful marriage as such is so considered.
But even if this be the case, the matter is for the legislature, not the
school board to decide32 The Baker court found, however, that
while youthful marriages are not a crime, they are contrary to public
policy by virtue of the fact that the legislature has established the
lawful age for those who wish to marry as above high school age.
But, the Ohio Supreme Court stated in State -v. Gans," that child
marriages are contrary to public policy only when not entered into
by virtue of section 3101.04 of the Ohio Revised Code; that in these
instances the policy "against 'child marriages' must yield to a more
important public policy based on the premise that a greater social
benefit is derived from having as many members of our society as
possible born and raised as 'legitimate' rather than 'illegitimate'
children.""4 This is the situation that faced the relator in the subject
case.
There is some question whether extracurricular activities are a
right, or merely a privilege capable of being given or withdrawn at
will. A recent Ohio Attorney General's Opinion states: "In de-
29. Married High School Students Get Cooler Administrative Welcome, Opinion Poll,
Nation's Schools, June 1960, p. 69.
30. Burchinal, Do Restrictive Policies Curb Teen Marriages?, Overview, March 1960,
p. 72.
31. Perkins v. Board of Directors of the Independent School Dist., 56 Iowa 476, 479,
9 N.W. 356, 357 (1881).
32. In re State in Interest of Goodwin, 214 La. 1062, 1069, 39 So. 2d 731, 733-34
(1949).
33. 168 Ohio St. 174, 151 N.E.2d 709 (1958).
34. 1d. at 179, 151 N.X.2d at 712.
1965]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
veloping a program of education which meets the minimum stand-
ards adopted by the state board of education for the education of
Ohio youths, boards of education have uniformly included a multi-
tude of extracurricular activities. Such activities have become an
integral part of contemporary education . . ."" There is also case
law indicating that extracurricular activities are now to be considered
more than just a privilege.36 The United States Supreme Court has
also looked into this area of abuse of power over students, using
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to correct
abuses." In Meyer v. Nebraska,8 the Court, in defining liberty as
used in the fourteenth amendment, held that "it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract ...to acquire useful knowledge, to marry ...and gen-
erally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 9
It is questionable whether the school board's ruling in State
ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson" is logical. The primary purpose behind
the "multitude of extracurricular activities" in existence in high
schools today is to stimulate student interest in the school so as to
reduce the number of drop-outs. To give this policy its maximum
effect, it is necessary to include as many students as possible in the
program. If married students are a large segment of this drop-out
group, does it follow that prohibiting them from extracurricular
activities will improve the likelihood of their remaining in school?
The school boards and courts are trying desperately to find a
35. 1962 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. (Ohio) 346, 348. The court in State ex rel. Baker
v. Stevenson, however, questioned the propriety of the attorney general's invasion into
this area. But in Anderson v. Wolf, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 161 (Ct. App. 1934), the court
favorably considered an attorney general's opinion directed toward a school board
official. Surely the attorney general may advise all government officials in his official
capacity. See OHIO REV. CODE § 109.12; 6 OHIO JUR. 2d Attorney General § 4
(1954). Granted that an attorney general's opinion is not binding on any court, it
has been held that it should receive their careful consideration and has generally been
regarded as highly persuasive. Carter v. Commission of Qualifications of Judicial Ap-
pointments, 14 Cal. 2d 179, 93 P.2d 140 (1939); Otter Tail Power Co. v. Elbow
Lake, 234 Minn. 419, 49 N.W.2d 197 (1951); Jones v. Williams, 121 Tex. 94, 45
S.W.2d 130 (1931).
36. See Attorney General ex rel. Wendrow v. Knapp, 310 Mich. 385, 391, 17 N.W.2d
223, 225 (1945). But see State ex rel. High School Athletic Ass'n v. Lawrence Circuit
Court, 240 Ind. 114, 162 N.E.2d 250 (1959).
37. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923). But see Waugh v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Miss., 237
U.S. 589 (1915).
38. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
39. Id. at 399.
40. 189 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
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cure for a very grave social problem. But with due respect for both,
it does not appear that they are succeeding by punishing married
students. The better approach would be to take corrective steps
prior to when these students marry. Most sociologists and educators
have concluded that the best approach is to educate young people
while they are still in the lower grades or in junior high school in
the wisdom of remaining single until after high school graduation.4
The school boards and courts, above all, should be the first to realize
that the best way to cure social problems is by imparting knowledge
and understanding, not by imposing restrictions, prohibitions, or
sanctions.
LARRY S. TURNER
41. See generally Buscher, Forsaking All Others, NEA Journal, Feb. 1955, p. 76;
Hanson, What to do About High School Marriages, Education, May 1960, p. 574;
Hanson, Teen Age Marriages, NEA Journal, Sept. 1961, p. 26; Teenage Marriages,
School Review, Feb. 1955, p. 72; Matthews, The Courts and Married Students, School
Life, Nov.-Dec. 1961, p. 5; Snowberger, Teenage Marriages and the Homemaking
Teacher, The Education Digest, April 1959, p. 46.
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